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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
BEN MILLER and JOVALLE ) 
THOMAS, ) 
) 





LAWRENCE SG McMULLEN, ) 
) 
Defendant and } 
Appellant. ) 
) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a tort action arising out of a semi-truck-
automobile accident which occurred on the 10th day of November, 
1979, 4ol miles West of Delta, in Millard County, State of 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to a jur~ resulting in a special 
verdict favoring plaintiffso The court entered judgment on the 
verdict on June 24, 1981 in favor of plaintiff, Ben Miller, in 
the amount of $67,650000, and in favor of plaintiff, JoValle 
Thomas, in the amount of $73,750.00. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment on the 
verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This negligence action arose out of an accident 
which occurred November 10, 1979, on U.S. Highway 6/50 in 
Millard County, Utah, just west of Delta, Utah. The respond-
ent, Ben Miller was driving a Kenworth semi-tractor-trailer 
in the eastbound lane and appellant was driving a Subaru 
station wagon in the westbound lane. 
Because the appellant could not remember anything 
about the accident, the testimony of plaintiff, Ben Miller, 
was crucialo Mr. Miller testified that the Subaru had turned 
into the eastbound lane signalling to make a left hand turn 
at an intersection. After applying his brakes, Mr. Miller 
elected to avoid a head-on and surely fatal collision by re-
leasing the truck brakes and swerving into the westbound 
lane in an effort to go around the appellant's Subaru. As 
he executed that evasive maneuver, appellant in the Subaru 
looked up and noticed the oncoming diesel, and swerved back 
into the westbound lane after Mr. Miller had committed to his 
evasive maneuver. The collision occurred in the westbound 
lane. 
- 2 -
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During negotiations between appellant's insurance 
company and respondent, Mr. Miller submitted to a lie detector 
examination. A copy of the examination was furnished the 
appellant's insurance company, State Farm Mutual, which 
thereafter paid the $25,000.00 property damage limit of 
its policy insuring appellant Lawrence McMullen. 
In chambers, immediately prior to trial, Mr. Thurber, 
attorney for respondents informed the court and counsel of 
the existence of the polygraph test and of his desire to 
introduce the results into evidence. Mr. Ivie, attorney for 
appellant, objected to such introduction. The court adman~ 
ished Mre Thurber not to mention the polygraph test in the 
opening statement, indicating that the court would decide 
the question of admissability later during trial when it 
arose. Mrc Thurberclidnot mention the lie detector test 
in his opening statement. Later, during cross-examination 
by Mr. Ivie, Mro Miller volunteered that he had taken a 
lie detector test (R. 376). 
At that point, appellant's attorney asked for a 
recess and made a motion for mistrial out of the presence of 
the jury. (R. 376~77) The motion was taken under advisement 
by the Court (R. 380). The next day at trial, the court 
heard testimony, out of the presence of the jury, regarding 
the circumstances under which the polygraph test was taken 
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(R. 532). The trial court denied appellant's motion for 
mistrial for the reason that since defense counsel had 
asserted Mr. Miller had lied on direct examination, it was 
not prejudicial or preventative of a fair trial when the 
witness "spontaneously blurts out" that he had passed a 
polygraph test regarding the matters at issue (R. 548-59) . 
The court further ruled that it would allow the polygraph 
test into evidence only if the proper foundation was pro-
vided before hand to insure reliability of the results. 
(R. 549-50) Mr. Thurber reserved the right to call a 
polygraph examiner in rebuttal ~v~dence (R. 551) • 
Later, during rebuttal, Mr. Thurber called Steven 
Taylor, a certified polygraph examiner, as a witness. In 
establishing foundation for Mr. Taylor's testimony, Mr. 
Thurber got no further than the witness's occupation when 
he was interrupted by defense counsel and a recess was 
calledo The court ruled during the recess that the witness 
could not testify, and he was excused. 
The trial thereafter continued to its conclusion 
and the jury returned a special verdict finding the appellant 
100% negligent, and set damages at $67,500.00 with respect 
to the driver., Mr. Miller, and $73,750.00 with respect to 
the passenger, JoValle Thomas. Judgment was entered on the 
verdict in open court. Thereafter, appellant made a motion 
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for new trial and a motion for reduction of special damages. 
Both motions were denied by the trial court October 1, 1981. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE THE COURT'S 
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
Essentially, appellant's claims of error regarding 
denial of his mistrial motion go to the alleged belief that 
the jury was prejudiced by Ben Miller's spontaneous remark 
during cross-examination about the lie detector testo The 
context of this volunteered statement was cross~examination 
in which.the appellant's attorney was attempting to show 
that the witness had lied during direct examinationo When 
pressed, Mro Miller rather angrily stated that he knew what 
Mro Ivie was trying to do and that he had passed a lie 
detector test to verify what he was testifying was the trutho 
(R. 376) 
This one brief remark is the only statement that 
could have possibly influenced the jury. Appellant in his 
brief quotes language from the transcript (See appellant's 
brief P. 4-7) concerning the discussions regarding the poly~ 
graph test; but all of those conversations were out of the 
- 5 -
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presence of the jury and no prejudice could possibly have 
resulted. Next, appellant quotes language from·· the sub-
sequent day of trial wherein the trial judge heard testimony 
out of the jury's presence regarding the test and thereafter 
ruled on the mistrial motion (See appellant's brief P. 7-9). 
Finally, appellant quotes language from the trial transcript 
(See appellant's brief P. 9-11) wherein Mr. Thurber began to 
qualify a polygraph examiner as an expert witness. Mr. 
Thurber got no further into the qualification process than 
name, residence, occupation and education when he was inter-
rupted and the court refused to allow further testimony. 
Because the trial court denied the motion for mistrial and 
ruled the polygraph test result would be admissible only 
if the expert qualified and proper foundation was established, 
it is difficult to understand how Mr. Thurber's brief pre-
liminary questioning could possibly have prejudiced the jury. 
The witness never even testified that he had conducted an 
examination. 
Appellant appeals the Court's denial of his mistrial 
motion claiming error based upon prejudice resulting from 
the witness's reference to a lie detector test, not upon 
the question of admissibility of a lie detector test results. 
Therefore, whether the trial court's decision to admit the 
test result was error, or whether uniformity of criminal and 
- 6 -
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civil cases regarding admissibility should exist, is not the 
question. The question is whether Mr. Miller's volunteered 
statement was prejudicial under the circumstances. 
A. The Granting or Denying of a Motion for Mistrial 
or New Trial is Within the South Discretion of the Trial 
Court. Such Discretion Will Not be Overturned Without a 
Showing of Substantial-Prejudice. 
The conduct of a trial lies within the trial judge's 
sound discretion. Because of the trial court's favored 
position to observe the subjective effect trial incidents 
have upon jurors, appellate review of the trial court's dis-
cretionary rulings is limited. Utah law is explicit on this 
pointo 
"The granting of a motion for mistrial lies in 
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his 
ruling should be overturned only when it clearly 
appears that he abused his discretion. A mis~ 
trial should be granted only when it appears that 
justice will be thwarted unless a jury is dis~ 
charged and a new trial granted." Watkins & 
Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979). 
B. Standards of Appellate Review of a Trial Court's 
Exerise of Discretionary Power. 
Utah law establishes a two part standard of review. 
The first part deals with abuse of discretion, and relates to 
the action taken by the trial court with regard to alleged 
improprieties. The second part involves substantial preju-
dicial effect and focuses upon whether the improprieties were 
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of substantial gravity to preclude a fair and impartial 
trial. The moving party must satisfy both elements before 
an appellate court will overturn the trial court's action. 
"The purpose of the trial is to afford the parties 
a full and fair opportunity to present their 
evidence and their contentions and to ha~e the 
issues in dispute between them determined by a 
jury; and that when that has been accomplished 
we will not disturb the determination made by 
... the trial court unless it is shown that there 
was a substantial and prejudicial error which 
prevented a fair trial, ... " Lee v. Howes, 
548 P.2d 619 621 (Utah 1976). 
"The broad discretionary power of the trial court 
in granting or denying of new trial is well 
established. And we have repeatedly expressed 
our reluctance to interfere with its judgment 
in such matters unless the action is clearly 
unreasonable and arbitrary." Page v. Utah Home 
Fire Ins. Co., 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290, 292-
93 (1964). 
The trial court has broad discretionary power over 
the conduct of the trial and in deciding the prejudicial 
effect of any alleged improprieties. The trial court's 
exercise of such discretion will generally not be overturned 
unless it is clearly demonstrated that the court abused its 
discretion. The reason for this deference to the trial court 
is: 
"[T]he advisability and indeed the necessity of 
enabling the trial judge to properly perform 
his function as the authority in charge of the 
trial by giving him a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in ruling on such matters. (footnotes 
omitted) Experience teaches that just as sure as 
human beings are involved, untoward happenings of 
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various kinds will continue to occur during trials. 
It is the responsibility of the trial court to 
rule upon questions which arise concerning whether 
any such occurrence has prevented a party from 
having a fair trial; ... Due to the fact that this 
is primarily his responsibility; and that he is in 
a position of advantage to observe the appearance, 
demeanor and reactions of all persons concerned, and 
the result which eventuates, his rulings on such 
matters should be looked upon with iridulgence and. 
should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears 
that he has abused his discretion." Robinson v. 
Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d, 261, 409 P.2d 121, 124 
(1965) 0 
As indicated, in order to justify overturning the 
trial court's decision requires a clear and convincing show-
• 
ing of the trial court's abuse of discretiono This is 
usually accomplished, if at all, by demonstrating to the 
appellate court's satisfaction the substantial prejudice 
the alleged improprieties had upon the verdicto Rule 61 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure addresses itself to 
this subject as follows: 
Harmless Error 
No error •.. or defect in any ruling or order of 
in anything done ..• by any of the parties, is ground 
for granting a new trial,.o.unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of 
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
The appellant has not demonstrated either substantial 
or any other prejudice arising from Mr. Miller's one single 
volunteered remark toward the beginning of a three day trial. 
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The trial judge carefully considered the remark, and heard 
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the poly-
graph examination of Mr. Miller. Appellant's counsel should 
have known about the polygraph test in advance of the trial 
since his real client (State Farm) was fully aware of its 
existence and had a copy. If counsel thereafter pressed Mr. 
Miller regarding the veracity of his story and in fact asserted 
as he did that Mr. Miller was lying, he could fully expect 
that the fact of the polygraph test would be volunteered. 
Under these circumstances there was no abuse of the court's 
discretion and certainly no substantial prejudice requiring 
reversal. 
POINT II 
NO PREJUDICE RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY REGARDING THE EFFECT OF COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
The trial court's decision whether to give or not 
to give an instruction is another discretionary matter. The 
standards of review outlined above apply equally to such 
rulings of the trial court. 
The state of the law in Utah regarding informing 
the jury of the effect of comparative negligence is unsettled. 
Defendant cites Mc Ginn v. Utah Power and Light Co., 529 P.2d 
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423 (Utah 1974) arguing that decision should control. Mc Ginn 
involved an Idaho comparative negligence statute, and this 
court in its decision stated that the rule it was adopting 
was substantive and not separable from the statute. That 
decision is not determinative of the question how the Court 
should rule when faced with a case requiring application of 
the Utah statute. 
The recent case of Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 
(Utah 1979) raised grave doubts as to the validity of the 
Mc Ginn rational. The concurring and dissenting opinions 
in Lamkin both indicated that Mc Ginn should be reconsiderede 
The proposition that the jury should be informed of the 
effect of its apportionment of fault in a special verdict is 
forcibly argued by the last Professor E.Wo Thode in Compara-
tive Negligence, Contribution Among Tort Feasors, and the 
Effect of a Release--~A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 
1973 Utah L. Rev. 306 414-418. Professor Thode concludes 
that to allow the jurors to intelligently fulfill their 
sworn responsibility, they should be informed of the legal 
effect of their comparison of negligenceo Indeed, accord~ 
ing to Professor Thode, failure to instruct as to the effect 
may be may be affirmatively misleading. 
"Absent such an instruction, a sensible juror 
is likely to believe that plaintiff will re-
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cover, but that the damages will be reduced 
proportionately if plaintiff's contributory 
negligence is found to be less than one hun-
dred percent. Such an assumption would be 
accurate in a 'pure' comparative negligence 
state, but not in Utah, where plaintiff's 
negligence must be less than the defendant's 
negligence for plaintiff to recover anything 
from the defendant." Id. at 418. 
In the present case, the special verdict (R. 196-97) 
contained only five questions. Question three, dealing with 
apportionment of negligence, was not answered because in 
question two, the jury found that the respondent, Ben Miller, 
was not negligent. The jury made no finding of negligence 
requiring comparison which instruction 10 could have inf lu-
enced at all. The court's instruction, if error, is on its 
face totally harmless. 
Had the jury returned a compara~ive finding in the 
range of .plaintiff fifty-five percent negligent and defend-
ant forty five percent negligent, as happened in McGinn, 
then appellant's position might have merit. But where, as 
here, the jury found the appellant one hundred percent 
or wholly liable for causative fault, the questioned instruc-
tion could in no way have effected or prejudiced the jury. 
Appellant has completely failed to demonstrate the substantial 
prejudice required to justify this Court's overruling 
of the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for new 
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trial upon the ground of claimed error in the giving of the 
instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The grounds for appeal asserted by appellant totally 
fail to demonstrate either abuse of discretion or substantial 
prejudiceo Respondents respectfully request that the appeal 
be dismissed and remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedingso 
DATED THIS /£ day of June, 1982 o 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANTHONY Mo THURBER sc:::o._.__ 
Attorney for plaintiffs-respondents 
- 13 -
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